Background. In May 2012, the New Hampshire (NH) Division of Public Health Services (DPHS) was notified of 4 persons with newly diagnosed hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection at hospital X. Initial investigation suggested a common link to the hospital cardiac catheterization laboratory (CCL) because the infected persons included 3 CCL patients and a CCL technician. NH DPHS initiated an investigation to determine the source and control the outbreak.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that approximately 3.2 million people in the United States have chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection, many of whom are unaware of their infection [1] . HCV is a bloodborne pathogen that can result in liver disease, cirrhosis, and hepatocellular carcinoma in the approximately 85% of infected individuals who develop chronic infection [2] . Healthcare-associated transmission has been previously reported [3, 4] and is typically attributed to breaches in infection prevention practices [1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Drug diversion is another cause of healthcare-associated transmission that occurs when patients are exposed to the blood of an HCV-infected healthcare worker through contaminated syringes or intravenous lines attributable to abuse of narcotic drugs intended for patients by the healthcare worker. Drug diversion has resulted in at least 3 previously reported HCV outbreaks in the United States, although underreporting is likely [11] [12] [13] [14] .
On 15 May 2012, the New Hampshire (NH) Division of Public Health Services (DPHS) was notified that 4 persons who had received care at hospital X between January and March 2012 had recently been diagnosed with new HCV infection. The 4 cases had been diagnosed at the same hospital X-affiliated gastroenterology practice between January and May 2012. All 4 had elevated liver enzymes, 2 had symptoms associated with acute hepatitis, and 1 had evidence of seroconversion. The diagnosing healthcare providers believed the number of new diagnoses was unusual for the practice and the cases were reported to DPHS as a suspected outbreak under outbreak reporting requirements. The initial epidemiologic investigation revealed a common link to hospital X's cardiac catheterization laboratory (CCL) and its adjacent recovery room; 3 patients had undergone CCL procedures and 1 was a CCL technician. This report describes the NH DPHS investigation to identify the outbreak source and scope, and to prevent further transmission.
METHODS

Epidemiologic Methods
To identify the source of the HCV infections, NH DPHS conducted multiple visits to the hospital to identify and assess CCL processes. NH DPHS also reviewed the medical records of HCV-infected and potentially exposed patients to identify HCV testing history and acquisition risk factors and to collect other relevant data using a standard data extraction tool. Potentially exposed patients were those who received care in the CCL or adjacent recovery room between the date of the first confirmed HCV transmission and the date that the outbreak was declared and the CCL closed on 25 May 2012. The process for determining potentially exposed patients was iterative whereby testing was offered to all patients who received care in the CCL in the 6 months preceding the earliest known HCV transmission. As new and earlier HCV transmissions were identified, the testing period was extended 6 months earlier until no new HCV transmissions were identified. NH DPHS staff interviewed all patients who were confirmed to be infected with the outbreak strain and those with positive serology and negative reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (ie, cleared infection) and classified their infection according to the case definitions shown in Table 1 . All CCL and recovery room staff who were working at the time of confirmed HCV transmission were also interviewed regarding potential modes of transmission. Staff assignments, work schedules, and CCL card key access records were used to document staff presence in the CCL and recovery room units during days of confirmed HCV transmission.
New Hampshire DPHS calculated aggregate use of controlled medications in CCL procedures (fentanyl and midazolam) during 2 time periods: "preemployment data" between January and March 2011 (prior to the infected technician's employment), and "post-employment data" between January and March 2012, based on records from the automated drug dispensing machine. The amount of controlled substance used in the CCL was estimated by subtracting the amount that was returned to the pharmacy and documented as discarded ("wasted") from the amount dispensed. The average monthly medication use per procedure was calculated by dividing the monthly use by the number of procedures and was compared between the 2 time periods as well as the average use among confirmed cases, probable and suspected cases, and unknown cases. Two-samples independent t test was used to analyze the data, with statistical significance set at P < .05. All statistical analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel 2003 (Redmond, Washington) and OpenEpi version 2.3.1 [15] .
Laboratory Methods and Testing Strategies
To confirm that the 4 index cases were linked, the NH Public Health Laboratories (PHL) sequenced the nonstructural 5B (NS5B) region and the hypervariable region 1 (HVR1) of the HCV genome as detailed below. Samples were also tested for other blood-borne pathogens to rule out relevant coinfections, including hepatitis B (surface antigen testing with ETI-MAK-2 Plus, Diasorin Inc, Stillwater, Minnesota) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) (testing by fourth-generation enzyme immunoassay, Abbott Architect HIV Ag/Ab Combo Assay, Abbott Diagnostics, Abbott Park, Illinois). Cleared infections were patients with positive serology and negative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing or with positive PCR but very low viral load that could not be sequenced. c Risk factors: high-risk: intravenous drug use (ever), blood transfusion, or blood products before 1992; low-risk: needle-stick blood exposure (ever), tattoo or nonear body piercing (ever), hemodialysis (ever).
For additional case finding, a testing algorithm was developed ( Figure 1 ). New Hampshire DPHS defined the risk group as any patient who received care in the CCL or adjacent recovery room between the date of the first confirmed HCV transmission and the date that the outbreak was declared and the CCL closed. All potentially exposed patients were contacted and recommended for HCV testing. To try to identify the timing of the outbreak onset, NH DPHS also recommended testing for patients who underwent a CCL or recovery room procedure in the 6 months prior to the earliest known HCV transmission. Patients who were known to have preexisting HCV infection were included in the testing recommendation.
All staff members at the CCL, recovery room, and pharmacy were also tested for HCV to rule out other possible infection sources. As the investigation evolved, testing recommendations were expanded to include patients who received care in the intensive care unit (ICU) and the operating rooms (ORs) where the infected technician also had access during the period of employment. In this testing expansion phase (ICU and OR patient testing), OraSure rapid testing was added as a screening tool and blood samples were sent to the NH PHL for additional testing [16] .
The NH PHL used standard methods to test for anti-HCV antibodies (ORTHO HCV version 3.0 enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay). HCV RNA was detected using Cobas Amplicor HCV version 2.0 RT-PCR (Roche Molecular Systems, Indianapolis, Indiana). Direct sequencing of HCV NS5B and HVR1 regions was performed with ABI 3130xl Genetic Analyzer (Life Technologies, Grand Island, New York). All anti-HCV positive samples were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for additional testing. The specimens that were anti-HCV positive but HCV RNA negative at the NH PHL were tested by a more sensitive COBAS Ampliprep/TaqMan 48 HCV version 2.0 (Roche Molecular Systems, Indianapolis, Indiana) with a lower limit of detection (15 IU/mL). All specimens that were anti-HCV positive and HCV RNA positive were subjected to HVR1 quasispecies (QS) analysis, as described in Ramachandran et al [17] . In brief, endpoint-limiting dilution PCR was performed to isolate sequence variants of HVR1 from each HCV RNA-positive serum specimens. About 96 PCR assays were routinely conducted to obtain approximately 48 clones (45%-55% positivity), and then sequenced using ABI 3130xl Genetic Analyzer (Life Technologies). ClustalW was used to make a multiple alignment of HVR1 sequences obtained by direct sequencing at the NH PHL and HVR1 QS sequences generated at the CDC Division of Viral Hepatitis Laboratory. Pairwise nucleotide distance (number of nucleotide difference) was calculated and a phylogenetic tree of the HVR1 sequences was constructed using Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis version 6.0 (MEGA 6). CDC laboratorians were blinded to clinical information and previous HCV testing results. This work was conducted as part of routine public health surveillance and investigation activities, and institutional review board approval was not required.
RESULTS
HCV isolates from the 4 index cases (3 CCL patients and 1 CCL technician) were determined to have genotype 1b infection based on NS5B sequence analysis. The 4 index cases had 100% sequence similarity in HVR1, indicating a common source of infection. All samples were negative for hepatitis B virus and HIV. Given that the 4 cases were infected with the same strain of HCV and had epidemiologic linkage, NH DPHS recommended that hospital X close the CCL and recovery room until the source of the outbreak could be determined.
NH DPHS identified and recommended testing for 1214 CCL and recovery room patients who were potentially exposed, and 1074 patients (89%) were tested. Among those tested, 77 (7%) tested positive for anti-HCV antibodies, and 50 CCL patients (including the first 3 patients) and 2 hospital employees (including the CCL technician) also tested positive for active infection evidenced by presence of HCV RNA. Phylogenetic analysis showed that the HVR1 sequences from the CCL technician and 32 case patients clustered in 1 group (Figure 2) . The similarity (percentage of nucleotides shared) between the CCL technician and the 32 case patients in the HVR1 ranged from 97.5% to 100%. Among the 32 case patients, 26 were confirmed by direct sequencing of HCV HVR1 performed at the NH PHL, and the remaining 6 were confirmed by quasispecies analysis conducted at the CDC laboratory. Of the 6 case patients confirmed by CDC quasispecies analysis only, 3 had low viral load and 3 were coinfected with 2 HCV strains (2 patients with 1b/1a and 1 with 1b/2a), 2 of whom had chronic HCV diagnosis predating the outbreak. Eighteen patients had unrelated active HCV infection. Twenty-seven patients had evidence of cleared HCV infection and were classified based on the outbreak-specific case definitions as probable (n = 4), suspected (n = 5), unknown (n = 15), and unrelated (n = 3). The characteristics of these patients are described in Table 2 and their procedure dates are shown in Figure 3 .
To identify infected patients before seroconversion may have occurred, samples from patients with exposure dates between 1 March and 25 May 2012 were submitted for both HCV antibody and HCV RNA testing. There were 192 patients who fell into this group, with an average timeframe between exposure and testing of 52 days (range, 7-118 days). Of these, 179 patients were negative for both HCV antibody and HCV RNA. Nine patients were positive for both HCV antibody and HCV RNA, and four were positive for only HCV antibody. No patients with exposure within this time period displayed antibody-negative/ RNA-positive results. A total of 354 patients with initial negative HCV testing within 6 months of their exposure were recommended to have follow-up serology testing at 6 months postexposure. None of the 238 patients (67%) who received follow-up testing had evidence of seroconversion. Testing of 2679 of 3505 (76%) ICU and OR patients with potential exposure did not identify any additional outbreak-associated cases. Other than the infected technician, no other employee from hospital X (among 47 CCL and recovery room employees and 29 pharmacists tested) was found to be infected with the outbreak strain of HCV.
Site visits to the CCL did not identify significant infection control breaches, but there were significant gaps identified in controlled medication use, control, and oversight in the unit. These included (1) a practice of drawing controlled substances from the automated machine and leaving them on top of the machine when not in use, (2) use of an unlocked mobile box containing controlled medications that was not subject to regular reconciliation of content, (3) variable controlled medication wasting processes and documentation, and (4) lack of regular audits to reconcile the different systems in which medication use was documented. Of the 74 case-patient procedure records reviewed, 9 procedures (12%) had documentations of medication discrepancies, including 4 cases where a full vial was unaccounted for in records. In addition, investigation revealed instances where controlled medication was dispensed after procedure completion, under the wrong patient's name, documented as administered by an unauthorized healthcare worker (HCW), and incident reports of syringes and vials found outside patient care areas, with no documentation of appropriate follow-up after these breaches.
Review of controlled medication use data revealed a pattern of high fentanyl use among confirmed case patients' procedures (226 μg ± 165 μg) in the CCL. Between patient categories, use per procedure in confirmed case patients (226 μg ± 165 μg) was comparable to probable and suspected case patients (215 μg ± 94 μg; P = .85), whereas it was significantly lower in unknown case patients (126 μg ± 73 μg; P = .002). The average monthly CCL fentanyl use per procedure during the preemployment period (63 μg ± 8 μg) was lower than during the infected technician's employment period (79 μg ± 25 μg; P = .35), though this difference was not statistically significant ( Figure 4) .
The infected technician began work at hospital X in April 2011 as a temporary traveling technician and was later hired as a permanent employee in October 2011. He did not disclose his HCV status at the time of hire. During interviews, 7 of 47 (15%) employees expressed concerns about erratic behavior in the infected technician. Urine drug testing was negative upon hire in April 2011 and no subsequent testing was performed. Four employees (9%) also noted that he was often present in the procedure room on days he was not scheduled for work. This was supported by review of staff assignment, work schedule, and card key access records. The infected technician was the only employee present on all procedure days for 31 of 32 (97%) confirmed case patients and 4 of 4 (100%) probable case patients. Controlled medication use among cardiac catheterization laboratory patients during a drug diversion-associated hepatitis C virus outbreak, New Hampshire. P values <.05 were considered statistically significant. Employment and preemployment averages were calculated using monthly aggregated fentanyl usage across all procedures whereas averages for confirmed, probable, and suspected cases were calculated using fentanyl usage data for each individual procedure.
The remaining confirmed case patient had undergone a CCL procedure just prior to the infected technician's hire date, but the patient's related hospital stay overlapped with the technician's employment. The technician was documented as present in patient charts for only 17 of 32 (53%) confirmed cases and 1 of 4 (25%) probable cases, but procedure records were incomplete regarding staff presence. All 259 patients receiving care prior to his employment who complied with testing were negative for the outbreak strain, which helped demonstrate that his employment marked the onset of the outbreak. Review of the technician's employment history prior to his arrival in NH revealed employment in 15 hospitals in 7 other states since 2005; NH DPHS notified these respective state health departments. A multistate outbreak investigation revealed a prior positive HCV test for the infected technician in another state in 2010, and patient testing in prior employment sites confirmed additional outbreak-related HCV cases [18] .
CONCLUSIONS
This report from New Hampshire describes the largest laboratory-confirmed nosocomial hepatitis C outbreak related to drug diversion, with at least 32 patients infected by a single technician in a cardiac catheterization laboratory. Proving the source of this outbreak posed special challenges and required extensive investigation, as is common in drug diversion-associated outbreaks [3] . Despite repeated interviews, the technician did not admit to drug diversion during the outbreak investigation; however, supporting the prospect of drug diversion were evidence of gaps in controlled medication control and oversight in the CCL, drug discrepancies, and significantly higher controlled medication use in confirmed cases. The epidemiologic curve, displaying dozens of cases spanning a period of 15 months, further strengthened controlled medication diversion as mode of transmission because environmental viability of the virus is limited [19, 20] . Information confirming the source was compiled from coworkers' interviews, employee testing that ruled out other potential sources, and review of schedule and card key access records that proved the infected CCL technician to be the only employee present for the procedure or related hospital stay for all confirmed and probable cases. The fact that employment controlled medication use data was not significantly higher compared to preemployment data can be explained by the inconsistent frequency of drug diversion activities. The approach to patient testing, although complex, proved to be an effective method of associating the outbreak onset to the infected technician's employment. Local investigations in prior sites of employment revealed evidence to suggest prior controlled medication diversion activities by the infected technician [18] . While the infected technician was reported as a new diagnosis of HCV to DPHS, the multistate investigation identified an HCV diagnosis for this individual as early as 2010 [19] . Patient testing confirmed additional related cases, raising the number of confirmed cases to a total of 45 in 3 different states [11] . On 19 July 2013, long after the conclusion of the public health investigation, the infected technician eventually admitted to diverting drugs and pleaded guilty in federal court to tampering with a consumer product and obtaining controlled substances by fraud and was sentenced to 39 years in prison [11] . The infected technician admitted specifically to taking syringes filled with narcotics, self-injecting, and refilling the same syringes with saline before placing them back into the procedure area [11] .
This outbreak was identified and reported by astute healthcare providers who recognized an unusual number of new HCV diagnoses in their community. HCV was not a reportable disease in New Hampshire at the time of the outbreak; it is not clear whether the outbreak would have been identified earlier if individual diagnoses of HCV had been reported. Because 70%-80% of HCV infections are asymptomatic [21] , most (69%) of the confirmed cases in this outbreak were newly diagnosed as a result of the outbreak testing program. Additionally, nearly half of the new diagnoses reported traditional risk factors for HCV, so it is difficult to speculate whether these cases would have pointed to a healthcare-associated infection had they been reported to DPHS. Public health authorities have varying ability to collect risk factor information for new diagnoses of HCV [22] . As such, this outbreak highlights the important role of the practicing healthcare provider in identifying potential public health threats and reporting them promptly to public health authorities.
One of the primary challenges in an outbreak is defining criteria for potential exposure. Our work demonstrates the need to cast a broad net when defining patients at risk in drug diversion-related outbreaks. Limiting testing to patients for whom the infected technician was documented as providing care would have led to missing 15 of 32 (47%) confirmed cases and 3 of 4 (75%) probable cases. We found card key access records to be an important additional tool in proving the infected technician's presence in the unit and identifying potential patient exposures.
An additional challenge in investigating a recent exposure is the possibility of false-negative testing. The estimated window period for detection of anti-HCV is up to 10 weeks and, for HCV RNA, 1 week [23] . To assure accurate case identification, we created an elaborate testing algorithm (Figure 1 ), including HCV RNA testing for everyone tested within 3 months of exposure. This proved to be redundant as none of the cases were identified by RT-PCR alone, even when initial testing was performed <1 month from exposure. Repeat serology 6 months after exposure, as recommended by national guidelines [24] , identified no cases of seroconversion. All cases found to have active infection had positive serology upon initial testing. This finding supports a high detection rate for enzyme immunoassay, even in the setting of recent exposure; further studies are needed to validate this finding.
All initial testing in this outbreak was carried out by the NH PHL, including direct sequencing of the HVR1, which confirmed the outbreak and identified 26 cases associated with the outbreak in addition to the outbreak source. This local capacity was essential to timely identification of confirmed cases. However, only 1 amplicon from each HCVinfected individual is sequenced and analyzed, so the direct sequencing of HVR1 may not be able to detect the outbreak strain when an infected individual has superinfection with multiple HCV genotypes/subtypes. QS analysis examining numerous amplicons from each HCV-infected individual, conducted at the CDC, was important in confirming the results as well as identifying patients coinfected with >1 HCV strain. Accurate identification of coinfection has both clinical [25] [26] [27] and epidemiological significance. Coinfection with >1 HCV strain has been previously described [28] [29] [30] but not in outbreak settings. In our investigation, 3 of 32 (10%) outbreak-associated cases were found to be coinfected. This could be the result of our population having higher prevalence of sporadic HCV infections (1.7%) or lower identification of coinfections in previous outbreaks, possibly due to the exclusion of chronically infected HCV patients from outbreak testing recommendations.
Drug addiction is a growing problem in the United States [31] [32] [33] [34] , and HCWs are not spared from its effects [35] . Drug diversion has been identified in recent years as a cause of HCV outbreaks [10] [11] [12] [13] 36] and has been perpetrated not only by HCWs authorized to handle narcotics, such as anesthesiologists [36] , but also by unlicensed HCWs including technicians and aides [11] [12] [13] , as in this outbreak. The implicated HCW's past employment status as a traveling technician was a unique feature of this outbreak. The multistate outbreak investigation uncovered multiple gaps in regulation and oversight of traveling allied HCWs [18] . These gaps, which allowed the infected technician to carry out his activities for several years, moving freely from state to state, need to be addressed urgently at the national level [18, 37] . Concurrently, healthcare facilities and public health will have to work together to mitigate this emergent threat to patient safety, which was one of the challenges in this investigation [38] . Healthcare facilities and public health should strengthen relationships and work together before a drug diversion incident occurs to create a proactive, comprehensive, approach for the prevention and early detection and reporting of drug diversion activities. Recommendations for healthcare facilities, based on the findings of the outbreak, are provided in Table 3 . • Support legislation to allow healthcare facilities to share concerns about drug diversion with future employers
• Improve process of background checks prior to hiring an employee
• Improve scrutiny when hiring traveling staff Domain B: Strengthen facility systems to promote prevention and early detection of drug diversion
• Assure limited access to procedure rooms where controlled substances are being administrated (eg, card key access requirement)
• Restrict access during a procedure only to HCWs with identified roles in the procedure and document their involvement in the patient's chart
• Improve processes related to the preparation and use of controlled substances including double-locking narcotics when not in use, preferably in an automated machine with biometric recognition.
• Ensure real-time accountability for controlled substances: ○ Timeout at the end of each procedure ○ Repeated wasting of full vials should trigger investigation (including HCW drug testing)
• Enhance controlled substances oversight by integrating all information systems to allow automatic flagging of narcotic discrepancies; if not possible, assure regular frequent manual audits
• Strengthen procedural management for use of mobile medication boxes
• Implement a comprehensive approach to proactive impeding of drug diversion: ○ Dedicated staff to coordinate drug diversion prevention efforts ○ Regular review of processes and procedures related to controlled substances in every unit ○ Ongoing staff education on signs of drug diversion ○ Multiple routes for staff to report drug diversion concerns, including anonymous reporting ○ Comprehensive action plan for suspected drug diversion concerns including blood-borne pathogens testing of the suspected HCW Domain C: Assure optimal response to suspected cases of drug diversion
• Develop a comprehensive action plan including trigger points to raise suspicion (eg, repeated wasting of full vials) and approach to keeping suspected HCW from patient care area until suspicion is negated
• Involve local law enforcement
• Report drug diversion cases to the relevant licensing boards or a single national/statewide entity in the case of unlicensed HCW (eg, the DataBank http:// www.npdb.hrsa.gov/)
• Test the suspected HCW for blood-borne pathogens to decide potential patient risk
• Report cases of drug diversion by an infected HCW to public health authorities and any other agencies required by law such as the Drug Enforcement Administration
Abbreviations: HCW, healthcare worker. a Additional detailed recommendations for healthcare facilities are available [11, 39] .
